1Business profile
NIKE, Inc., through its various subsidiaries, operates as a global enterprise focused on the design, development, marketing, and sale of athletic footwear, apparel, equipment, and accessories for all ages and genders. Beyond its primary offerings, the company provides a range of athletic and casual footwear, clothing, and accessories under the notable Jumpman trademark. It also distributes a variety of casual sneakers, apparel, and accessories, featuring well-known brands like Converse, Chuck Taylor, All Star, One Star, Star Chevron, and Jack Purcell. Under the NIKE brand itself, the company supplies a comprehensive line of performance sports gear and accessories, such as bags, socks, sports balls, eyewear, …
| Sector / Industry | Consumer Cyclical / Apparel - Footwear & Accessories |
| CEO | Elliott J. Hill |
| Beta (5y monthly) | 1.11 |
| Shares outstanding | 1,480M |
| 52wk range (EOD) | $34 – $75 |
| 50d / 200d avg | $39 / $49 |
2Financials — five-year trend
Five fiscal years, oldest first — revenue trajectory, margin structure, and free cash flow conversion (capex-light models track operating cash flow closely).
| FY | Revenue | Rev growth | Gross mg | Op mg | Net mg | FCF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $46.7B | n/a | 46% | 14% | 13% | $4.4B |
| 2023 | $51.2B | 10% | 44% | 12% | 10% | $4.9B |
| 2024 | $51.4B | 0% | 45% | 12% | 11% | $6.6B |
| 2025 | $46.3B | -10% | 43% | 8% | 7% | $3.3B |
| 2026 | $46.4B | 0% | 43% | 8% | 7% | $2.2B |
3Quality vs peers
NKE against the median of its S&P 500 apparel, accessories & luxury goods peer set (3 names: LULU, RL, TPR).
| Metric | NKE | Peer median | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| ROIC | 11% | 23% | capital efficiency vs the apparel, accessories & luxury goods peer set |
| ROE | 21% | 33% | note: buybacks can depress equity |
| Operating margin | 8% | 18% | |
| Gross margin | 43% | 70% | |
| P/E TTM | 16.2x | 15.8x | valuation side of the ledger |
4Valuation — own history & DCF
Trailing P/E of 16.2x sits at the 0th percentile of NKE's own six-year range; P/S at the 0th. Both multiples sit far from where this stock has historically traded — the market is pricing a materially different growth/quality premium than in prior years. Verdict: cheap vs own history. Two DCF lenses disagree on magnitude, not direction: FMP's model says $48 (+43% vs spot), our transparent FCFF says $20 (-42% vs spot). Both embed assumptions you can audit below — treat them as model output, not truth.
| Assumption | Value |
|---|---|
| WACC | 8.56% |
| Risk-free (FRED DGS10) | 5.24% |
| Beta | 1.11 |
| Equity risk premium | 4.5% (assumed) |
| Rev growth input | -3.2% fading to terminal over 10y |
| FCF margin (trailing) | 4.7% |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% (grid: 2.0–3.0%) |
| Terminal value share | 54% |
| Net debt | $0.4B |
Terminal value is 54% of the valuation — the model leans heavily on the far end of the forecast; WACC and terminal-g assumptions dominate.
5Expected move & options context
No ATM greeks available (ThetaData unavailable) — section suppressed.
6Risks & bear case
- Net margin compression — 11% → 7% → 7% over three years.
- Valuation leans on the terminal — 54% of DCF value sits beyond year 10; small assumption shifts move the answer a lot (grid below).
- The cheap multiple is itself a signal — 0th percentile of its own history says the market doubts the growth premium is coming back; cheap-vs-self is not cheap-vs-nothing.
- Judgment risks are not in these numbers — competitive disruption, product-cycle decay and management-transition risk have no clean data series here; the qualitative section carries that color with citations.
7Scenario framing
Scenario values are corners of the sensitivity grid — model outcomes under stated assumptions, not forecasts or targets. The decision space: at $33.87 the market price sits below even the bear-case model value (-52%); the debate is whether the market's growth discount or the model's fade assumptions are closer to reality.
| Scenario | Assumptions | Model value/share | vs spot |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | WACC +1pt, terminal g 2.0% | $16 | -52% |
| Base | current model inputs | $20 | -42% |
| Bull | WACC −1pt, terminal g 3.0% | $26 | -24% |
8News flow
Latest headlines from Yahoo Finance and Google News RSS — unfiltered wire, read with the usual skepticism about source quality; titles link out to the source.
9Qualitative read — management, health, theses
Cited qualitative research (Perplexity, Sonar model): how management is executing, operating-health signals that never hit the financial statements, and the live bull/bear debate. This is opinion synthesis with named sources — treat it as color around the numbers, not verified fact.
Credible commentary is broadly negative on near-term execution, but it still leaves room for a multi-year rebound if Elliott Hill’s reset works. The sharpest current read is that Nike is now a turnaround/cost-cut story, not a clean growth story, with management under pressure after weak guidance and a new $2.5 billion savings program[1][3].
On **management execution**, CNBC reported on Oct. 2 that Citi called Nike “neutral” and said management is “adapting to the reality of significant pressure within Sportswear, Jordan, and China” while rolling out cost cuts[1]. The Los Angeles Times on Oct. 2 quoted Vital Knowledge’s Adam Crisafulli saying repeated guide-downs are grating on investors, while Bloomberg Intelligence’s Poonam Goyal said North America is improving but the broader turnaround “may have stalled”[3]. A separate Oct. 1 preview framed Hill’s language as still mostly “strengthen the foundation,” suggesting the market wants more concrete proof[13].
On **operating health beyond the financials**, analysts and press are watching whether channel cleanup and inventory reduction restore customer demand and pricing power. Bernstein’s August note argued Nike is scaling back over-distributed classics to clear channel inventory, with gross margins expected to recover before revenue does[12]. The same piece tied the bull case to running momentum, World Cup activation, and a reorganization that stabilizes NIKE Direct and Greater China[12]. Recent reporting also points to weakness in Sportswear, Jordan, and China rather than a broad brand collapse[1][3].
On the **bull/bear theses for 1–3 years**, the **bull** case is: Hill’s restructuring improves execution, wholesale and running regain momentum, margins recover as promotions fade, and the buyback retires shares at depressed prices[8][12]. The **bear** case is: guidance keeps deteriorating, China and Converse worsen, and investors conclude the reset is dragging on too long[3][12]. Analyst ratings remain mixed-to-cautious: one Sept. 8 note cited Needham’s Tom Nikic as a buy with a $75 target, while broader coverage skewed hold-heavy[8].
2. https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/10/02/will-nike-ever-stop-falling-one-analyst-is-sure-that-buying-now-will-yield-100-gains/
3. https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2026-10-02/nike-shares-hit-lowest-level-since-2013-as-turnaround-falters
4. https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/10/02/nike-is-down-about-80-from-its-peak-and-just-told-investors-sales-will-fall-again/
5. https://stockstory.org/us/stocks/nyse/nke/news/earnings-call/nke-q3-deep-dive-deliberate-resets-weigh-on-revenue-as-nike-focuses-on-long-term-health
6. https://www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/us-stocks/262197532-nike-nke-stock-forecast-october-2-2026
7. https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/10/01/live-will-nike-crush-q1-earnings-tonight-after-a-2-intraday-pop/liveupdates/10/
8. https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/09/08/nike-is-in-free-fall-this-wall-street-ratings-agency-says-its-doubling-soon/
9. https://sgbonline.com/exec-analysts-see-slow-recovery-for-nike/
10. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/markets-news/motley/4606873/will-nike-s-stock-price-sink-to-23-here-are-the-bear-base-and-bull-cases-over-the-next-year/
11. https://tickeron.com/blogs/nike-nke-earnings-preview-gauging-turnaround-signs-after-a-40-slide-in-2026-17577/
12. https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/08/18/nike-keeps-tanking-one-pro-expects-85-returns-moving-forward/
13. https://www.investing.com/analysis/nike-earnings-preview-can-elliott-hill-give-investors-a-reason-to-believe-200688778
14. https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/03/24/wall-streets-76-target-on-nike-looks-absurd-until-you-look-at-the-numbers/
15. https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/consumer-durables/nyse-nke/nike
10Catalysts & macro linkage
- Earnings 2026-12-17, consensus EPS $0.3907 (FMP calendar).
- Fed target upper — DFEDTARU (daily policy rate) (rates — consumer credit & big-ticket demand) — 4.00% vs 4.25% a year ago, rising 30d over 3.75% 30d ago, as of 2026-10-03. Last move: +25bp on 2026-09-17. Rate path feeds the duration premium on a 1.1-beta name.
- Model refresh triggers: any FQ beat/miss on revenue, FRED DGS10 moves ≥25bp, or a new fiscal year in the ratios series re-runs the DCF.
11Appendix — data provenance
Every pull from report generation 2026-10-03. Raw payload: ~/Projects/market-report/work/NKE-2026-10-03.json.
| Endpoint / source | Rows | Status |
|---|---|---|
| profile | — | ok |
| batch-quote | 1 | ok |
| income-statement | 5 | ok |
| balance-sheet-statement | 2 | ok |
| cash-flow-statement | 5 | ok |
| ratios | 6 | ok |
| key-metrics | — | ok |
| ratios-ttm | — | ok |
| key-metrics-ttm | — | ok |
| discounted-cash-flow | — | ok |
| own-dcf-fcff | — | ok |
| theta-expected-move | — | error: no expiry/greeks |
| fred:DFEDTARU | 252 | ok |
| macro-linkage | — | ok |
| peer batch-quote | 3 | ok |
| peer ratios/key-metrics | 3 | ok |
| yahoo-chart | 501 | ok |
| earnings-calendar | 1 | ok |
| rss-news | 12 | ok |
| pplx-qualitative | — | ok |